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In a framework closely related to Diamond and Rajan (2001) we
characterize di®erent ¯nancial systems and analyze the welfare impli-
cations of di®erent LOLR-policies in these ¯nancial systems.
We show that in a bank-dominated ¯nancial system it is less likely
that a LOLR-policy that follows the Bagehot rules is preferable. In
¯nancial systems with rather illiquid assets a discretionary individ-
ual liquidity assistance might be welfare improving, while in market-
based ¯nancial systems, with rather liquid assets in the banks balance
sheets, emergency liquidity assistance provided freely to the market at
a penalty rate is likely to be e±cient.
Thus, a "one size ¯ts all"-approach that does not take the di®er-
ences of ¯nancial systems into account is misguiding.
¤We would like to thank Jean-Charles Rochet for a stimulating discussion and very
helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not those of
the Deutsche Bundesbank.
11 Introduction
In the last two decades ¯nancial crises, a phenomenon that most observers
in the 1970's thought to be a relict of the past, has reawakened the inter-
est of academics and practitioners. Following the collapse of the Bretton
Woods agreement in 1973 and the subsequent wave of deregulation in many
countries, ¯nancial crises reemerged. For instance, Lindgren and Saal (1996)
found that about three quarter of the IMF's member countries su®ered some
form of banking crises, though panics in the traditional sense were avoided
either by central bank interventions or by explicit or implicit government
guarantees. Nevertheless the experience with crises in Scandinavian coun-
tries like Norway, Finland and Sweden in the 1980's and more recently in
East-Asian and Latin-American countries shows that crises were particu-
larly disruptive in terms of the depth of ensuing recessions. This explains
why the question of how to prevent or handle ¯nancial crises is one of the
most lively debated policy and research issues in the ¯nancial community.
In this debate, largely unanimity prevails that the maintenance of ¯nan-
cial stability is facilitated by well-designed "safety net" arrangements aimed
at both limiting the risk of disruption in the ¯nancial system (crisis preven-
tion) and the consequences of disruption if it arises (crisis management). A
central element of these arrangements is the lender of last resort. There is
considerable agreement on the need of a lender of last resort to provide dis-
cretionary liquidity assistance to a ¯nancial institution or to the market as
a whole in reaction to an adverse shock which causes an abnormal increase
in demand for liquidity that cannot be met from an alternative source.1
Usually the role of a lender of last resort (LOLR) is assigned to the central
bank.
However, the question arises what are the principles that a lender of last
resort is supposed to follow. As far back as 1873, Bagehot (1873), based
on the work by Thornton (1802), formulated rules of a lender of last resort
policy. He suggested that in a crisis, the lender of last resort should lend
freely, at a penalty rate, on the basis of collateral that is marketable in the
ordinary cause of business when there is no panic.2 Especially, to discourage
risk taking by individual institutions the view holds that the lender of last
1See for a discussion of the lender of last resort function(s) Freixas, X. et al. (November
1999). Thus we do not want to touch the discussion if there should (and could) be an
institutional separation between a central bank which is responsible for the conduct of
monetary policy and a lender of last resort; on this topic see Goodhart (1995).
2See for instance Fischer (1999), Giannini (1999) and Goodhart (1999) for a discussion
of these rules.
2resort should lend whenever possible only to the market at penalty rate and
only against good collateral. By this maxim the doctrine of what a lender of
last resort should do today is still well-captured besides coming under some
criticism by authors like Goodhart (1999) or Giannini (1999).3
In this paper, we take a ¯rst step to investigate if such a "one size ¯ts
all"-approach with respect to lender of last resort policy makes much sense
having in mind the di®erences between ¯nancial systems of various countries.
This issue while very important is highly complex because as the literature
on comparative ¯nancial systems shows, there are many dimensions in which
¯nancial systems di®er.4 However, we focus our very simple analysis on one
dimension, namely the di®erences in the importance of relationship banking
in market-oriented and bank-dominated ¯nancial systems. Our research
question is the following: Given that ¯nancial structures di®er in this aspect
across countries, shouldn't also the lender of last resort policies with respect
to the form of liquidity assistance to the ¯nancial system be di®erent?
More speci¯cally, we build our analysis on the Diamond/Rajan-framework
and use this modelling structure as our starting point to incorporate cer-
tain stylized facts on di®erences between bank- and market-based ¯nancial
systems.5 The approach will be extended to explore what happens to the
functioning of a ¯nancial system if there is an aggregate shortage of liquid-
ity - if the supply of liquid assets is small relative to aggregate demand.
We are able to de¯ne di®erent cases for the resulting equilibrium on the
market for liquidity and thus develop a taxonomy of crises situations. This
gives us some hints on the probabilities and welfare consequences of certain
crises situations in the respective ¯nancial systems. In turn this allows us to
give a ¯rst assessment of type of interventions a lender of last resort should
follow. Especially, the question when - if at all - the lender of last resort
should charge a penalty interest rate and if the lender of last resort should
lend only to the market or to individual institutions, will be analyzed with
regard to the di®erent ¯nancial systems. Our main result is that under rea-
sonable assumptions individual liquidity assistance to banks is preferable in
bank-dominated ¯nancial system while in market-oriented systems a policy
3For instance, the Report on Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies by the
Group of Ten (1997) and Calomiris/Meltzer (1998) argue strongly in favor of an national
respectively international Lender of Last Resort-Policy under Bagehot rules.
4See Allen and Gale (2001) for a recent survey. This literature includes theoretical
analysis, e.g.Allen and Gale (2000), as well as more empirically oriented work such as
Franks and Mayer (1995) and Hackethal, Schmidt, and Tyrell (2002)
5See Diamond and Rajan (2001) for the basic framework and Diamond and Rajan
(2002) for an application to banking crises.
3following Bagehot's rules should be pursued.
Of course, we are not the ¯rst who discuss optimal lender of last resort
policy and especially the classical market doctrine of the lender of last re-
sort.6 But to our knowledge we are the ¯rst who analyze in a theoretical
framework the interrelationship between characteristic di®erences of ¯nan-
cial system con¯gurations and adequate lender of last resort policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
our framework. In section 3 the stability of an individual bank will be
investigated. It follows an analysis of the equilibrium in the liquidity market




Following Diamond and Rajan (2001) we consider an economy with three
dates (t = 0;1;2) and a large number of entrepreneurs, bankers and in-
vestors. Entrepreneurs are wealthless, however each of them has a project
at his disposal which requires an investment I = 1 at t = 0. Each investor
is endowed with a small amount of consumption good in comparison to the
required investment size, hence we need many investors to fund a project.
In addition, we assume that the aggregate endowment of all investors in the
economy is lower than the total investment possibilities. Because of this
shortage of investment capital at date 0 entrepreneurs and bankers must of-
fer an expected return as high as possible to attract funding. Entrepreneurs,
investors and bankers, whose role will be clari¯ed below, are risk-neutral but
di®er in their preferences: Investors and bankers have a strong preference
for consumption at date 1, i.e. they have a very high discount rate for con-
sumption at date 2, whereas entrepreneurs value consumption at each date
equally. Investors can storage their initial endowment earning a return of 1
for every unit invested, or they can invest it in the project.
Financing the projects includes some di±culties which have to be over-
come. Entrepreneurs have speci¯c abilities vis-a-vis their projects, i.e. the
cash °ow each entrepreneur can generate from his project exceed what any-
one else can get out of it. But entrepreneurs cannot commit their human
capital to the project, except on a spot basis. From this it follows that a
6See for instance Rochet and Vives (2002) for a very interesting model that shows how
a lender of last resort can avoid ine±cient liquidation of banks.
4lender can extract future repayment only by threatening to take away the
project from the initial entrepreneur. The project returns C generated by
the initial entrepreneur are uncertain in terms of their time structure. The
project pays out C either at t1 if the project produces early or ant t2 if the
project is delayed. All uncertainty about projects is resolved at date 1.
We consider two alternatives when taking away the project from an
entrepreneur. The project can be restructured at any time until date 1 which
will yield a payo® c1 immediately and nothing at date 2, or the entrepreneur
can be replaced with assets redeployed to their next-best use, which does
not change the timing of the produced cash °ow but the level to °C with
° < 1. Both alternatives result in a loss of surplus, since
c1 < 1 < °C < C; (1)
However, the big di®erence between this two alternative is the following:
The second alternative (replacement) can only be implemented by a bank
who was the only initial ¯nancier of the project while restructuring can be
done by any investor, irrespective of having been an initial ¯nancier of the
project or not.
How can we interpret these alternatives? Restructuring is an activity
which can be understood as changing the original content of the projects so
that some immediate cash can be produced without any speci¯c knowledge.
One may think of this strategy as abandoning the uncertain technology and
using instead a commonly known technology that produces goods quickly or
stopping half-¯nished projects and salvaging the production goods. All in-
vestors can realize this cash °ow, hence c1 is the secondary market value of a
project. On the other hand, replacing the entrepreneur and redeploying the
assets to their next-best use, which yields °C is an activity which demands
speci¯c skills for replacing the entrepreneur but preserving the original con-
tent of the project. It may involve searching for a new entrepreneur who
has similar skills to the original one, or abandoning only such aspects of the
project that were particulary dependent on the old entrepreneur. Because
this implies learning all about the project it takes time, e®ort and a constant
close contact to retain this skills. Therefore, we assume that just one initial
¯nancier, e®ectively a "relationship lender" or banker who collect the sav-
ings of the investors, will undertake this costly activity. Accordingly, only
the banker knows the next-best use of the project's assets. To sum up, the
ban can realize ° ¢ C from the project, if it takes the project away from the
initial entrepreneur, while other investors can only realize c1. Therefore, the
initial entrepreneur will o®er to repay ° ¢ C to a bank and only c1 to other
investors.
5How can we grasp the di®erences between ¯nancial systems in this mod-
elling structure? One obvious di±culty lies in the fact that this framework
taken at face value allows only banks to exist as intermediaries. Capital
markets in the literal sense as institutions, where ¯rms issue stocks and
bonds, households buy and trade these securities and the resulting prices
incorporate valuable information, are not caught in our modelling struc-
ture. Yet what makes the framework attractive is the possibility to grasp
certain consequences of market-based and bank-based ¯nancial systems.
We view a bank-based system as a con¯guration with a relatively high
° and a low c1 while the reverse, a relatively low ° and a high c1 is true
in a market-based system. A high ° points out that usually in a bank-
based system the intermediary has a great deal of information about her
borrowers and their projects because of a longlasting and close relationship.
As a consequence, she can enforce higher repayments from a borrower than
a typical lender in a market-based system who does not collect as much
knowledge and information. So the banker in a bank-based system can
"replace" the entrepreneur easier, thereby retaining much of the original
strategy of the initial entrepreneur. This gives her bargaining power. In
our opinion, this is an essential characteristic of a bank with typically ¯rm-
speci¯c knowledge.
On the other hand, c1 is the payo® of restructuring. Because this restruc-
turing is the best alternative, publicly available use, it can be interpreted
as the market value of these projects. A relatively high c1 indicates that
much information about the best alternative use is released in the market.
In sum we conclude that the di®erence between °C and c1 is rather small
in market-based systems.7 The assets are relatively liquid because a great
deal of information gets "externalized" through the market activities. This
re°ects the notion that there are many analysts working for mutual funds,
pension funds and other intermediaries who gather private information and
incorporate these through their trading activities in stock prices which is
the general advantage of a market-based system.
In bank-based systems assets are more illiquid. In countries with bank-
based systems, relatively few companies are listed and accounting disclo-
sure requirements are limited, so very little information is incorporated into
stock prices. Also the number of analysts who follow stocks is small, so only
limited private information is incorporated into stock prices. However, in-
termediaries have more information available in these systems. The greater
7Of course, we maintain the relation °C > 1 > c1 for a market-based system. Only
the di®erence is small.
6prevalence of long term relationships, i.e. the "hausbank"-relationship, in
bank-based systems means that the banks are able to acquire considerable
information about the ¯rm they lend to. Typically this information will not
be released to the market; instead the information will be used internally to
allow a smooth functioning of the long term ¯nancial relationship and allo-
cate resources e±ciently.8 Therefore information in a bank-based system is
more or less " internalized", outsiders to the ¯nancial relationship have only
a small chance to get valuable information.9 Banks have strong incentives to
acquire and use information because they can pro¯t from information which
doesn't leak to outsiders. However, this creates the problem that most of
the assets are rather illiquid because only the banker has the relevant infor-
mation. This means c1 is small and the di®erence between °C, the payment
a bank can extract, and c1, the market value of a loan, is large.
We feel that this parameterization captures one of the most important
underlying causes of the observable di®erences between bank-based and
market-based systems, namely the di®erent ways of acquiring and using
information in the respective systems.
2.2 Financial structure of ¯rms and banks
What complicates the ¯nancial relations in this economy is the presence
of speci¯c skills at two di®erent layers. First of all, original entrepreneurs
with their speci¯c abilities can generate a higher expected return from the
projects than everyone else but they cannot commit this human capital on
a long term basis to the projects. Thus, projects are illiquid in the sense
that they cannot be ¯nanced to the full extent of their cash °ows. The
second layer causes the illiquidity of the loans. Only an initial lender has
speci¯c skills to extract high repayments from the entrepreneur but she also
cannot commit her human capital to the loan. For these reasons the ¯nancial
contracts we consider specify only who owns the physical assets conditional
on the payments made.10 Let us turn to the resulting ¯nancial structure of
8See for instance von Thadden (1995) and Aoki/Dinc (1997) for theoretical analysis
and Elsas/Krahnen (1998) and Berlin/Mester (1998) for empirical analysis.
9See Tyrell (2001) for a discussion how these two perspectives on information, i.e.
externalization and internalization, can be mapped into two approaches to the role of
information in ¯nancial systems, namely the rational expectations literature on the role
of prices in resource allocation and the intermediation literature which is concerned with
the role of banks as delegated monitors.
10We assume a court system, which can enforce ¯nancial contracts and transfer assets to
lenders when contracted repayments are defaulted upon, but cannot compel entrepreneurs
or bankers to contribute their human capital. Thus the court can help to seize the project's
7a ¯rm ¯rst.
Initially the entrepreneur owns the machinery or project to produce
goods. Since he has no endowment, he needs to borrow to invest and is
obliged to pay back the credit later on. Hence, the contract signed by the
entrepreneur speci¯es a repayment and the assets the ¯nancier gets in case
of default. Because of his speci¯c abilities and the limited commitment
of human capital, an entrepreneur can credibly threat to withhold his hu-
man capital at any time until the cash °ows are produced. That gives him
bargaining power vis-a-vis the banker. Thus notwithstanding any ex-ante
agreement between entrepreneur and banker, the most the banker can get
as repayment for the credit is just her best outside option "replacement",
which yields °C. Only by threatening to take away the project and redeploy
it to this next-best use, the banker as an initial ¯nancier can extract this
amount as future repayment for the credit. In turn, this is also the max-
imum amount the entrepreneur can credibly pledge to an initial ¯nancier.
Since the economy is short of investment capital at date 0, entrepreneurs
are competing for the scarce resources and only a few of them get a loan by
bidding the maximum amount they can credibly pay back. This means that
in the ¯nancial contract the borrower promise to pay the banker Pt = °C on
demand. If, however, the project turns out to be late and the entrepreneur
cannot repay this amount and defaults, the bank has the property rights
over the project's assets and will decide what to do with them next.
How can the banker re¯nance the project? Only the banker as an initial
lender knows the next best use of the project's assets. During the course
of lending she acquired speci¯c skills which she can use to collect more on
the loan than other lenders could do. Similar to an entrepreneur the banker
possess human capital that she can threaten to hold back unless investors
reduce the required payment. Thus, she cannot commit to repaying to
outside investors the full amount that she can extract from an entrepreneur.
This also implies that the banker may not be able to raise the full present
value of the loan held. But bankers themselves have no endowment, so they
have to ¯nd a way to re¯nance the loan through outside investors, otherwise
they cannot persuade investors to entrust them with their goods in t = 0.
As a consequence, the bank couldn't act as the only initial ¯nancier of an
entrepreneur and the projects wouldn't be ¯nanced.11
assets resp. the bank's loans, however the value of these assets depends on the cash °ow
the lenders can generate out of the assets.
11Acquiring the speci¯c collection skills to enforce repayment on the part of an en-
trepreneur is a costly activity which is not worth doing by a small investor in analogy to
arguments given in Diamond (1984)
8As Diamond and Rajan (2001) show the bank can use a device to commit
to repayment up to the full value of the loan. The bank should re¯nance
lending by issuing uninsured demand deposits subject to a sequential ser-
vice constraint. The sequential service constraint creates a collective action
problem among depositors: If the bank makes an attempt to renegotiate
deposit repayments she will cause a run. Rather than making concessions
which may be in their collective interest, depositors ¯nd it in their individual
interest to run immediately to capture full repayment of their deposits. Be-
cause of the "¯rst come, ¯rst served" aspect of uninsured demand deposits,
they cannot be negotiated down. Individually each depositor has an incen-
tive to withdraw his claims as fast as possible because his payo® depends on
his place in line; it is a Nash equilibrium. In case of a run depositors seize
the assets and restructure all the projects destroying any potential rent of
the banker. It is not in the interest of a bank to renegotiate down an ex-ante
agreed repayment because courts would enforce depositors' demands, and
the rents of the banker would be destroyed. Therefore, the bank's ability
to create liquidity is inseparable from its potential fragility.12 Hence in a
world without uncertainty, a bank re¯nances entirely with demand deposits
to maximizes the credit it can o®er to entrepreneurs. The possibility of runs
exerts market discipline on banks, although bank runs are never observed in
equilibrium. Since the banker can threat not to deploy her speci¯c collec-
tion skills on behalf of the investors at any point after the deposit is made,
deposits must be demandable at any time to provide commitment value,
although consumption occurs only at date 1 or 2.
But a bank's capital structure typically involves (long-term) capital in
addition to demand deposits. The reason is that capital represents a softer
claim that demand deposits which can be renegotiated. In a world of un-
certainty, ¯nancing with only demand deposits carries a cost. It impose
the banks to destructive runs if they truly cannot pay because the realized
project cash °ows of entrepreneurs are too low. In this way, Diamond and
Rajan (2000) show that with observable but not veri¯able uncertainty in
project returns, it may be optimal for a bank to partially ¯nance with a
softer claim called capital. Capital holders cannot commit not to renegoti-
ate because they are not subject to a collective action problem. Thus capital
acts as a bu®er because its value adjusts to the underlying asset values and
can prevent ine±cient runs. On the other hand, this allows a banker to
capture some rents in the future and therefore reduces its ability to raise
funds and creates liquidity in the present. The optimal capital structure of
12See Diamond and Rajan (2001) for a full analysis of this mechanism.
9a bank has to trade-o® these costs against the bene¯ts of capital.
In the following we assume that banks face a capital requirement k.13
stating that a fraction k of the present value of a banks assets has to be
re¯nanced using capital. By normalizing our ¯nancing problem and the
capital structure of the bank on one investment project, we know that the
bank assets are worth °C when the entrepreneur can repay at date 1: Owing
to the capital shortage at date 0, the bank extracts all the rent from the
entrepreneur that can be pledged, leaving the entrepreneur a rent of (1¡°)C.
If D denotes the repayments on deposits , then °C ¡ D is the surplus that
can be split between the banker and the capital holder in the renegotiation
process. Assuming equal division of the surplus, capital owners will be paid
1
2(°C ¡ D) and the same amount will be absorbed by the banker as a rent.
It follows that D + 1
2(°C ¡ D) = 1
2(°C + D) will be passed on as total
pledgable payment per loan to depositors and investors holding a capital




2(°C+D)) gives the maximum amount re¯nanced by deposits: D = 1¡k
1+k°C.
Hence, the banker gets a rent of k
1+k°C per ¯nished project and capital




2.3 Local lending markets and the time structure of the
model
We argued in the last section that a banker acquires speci¯c collection skills
vis-a-vis entrepreneurs through her lending activity. But typically this ex-
perience or knowledge, which is costly to develop, can only be acquired for
a subset of the date 0 project opportunities. For instance, a bank may
only have experience in speci¯c industries or possess knowledge about spe-
ci¯c locations. From this it follows that each bank has a local monopoly in
lending.
To simplify our analysis we assume that the economy is divided into two
regions of the same size. The two regions are ex ante at date 0 identical
in every respect but can become heterogenous at date 1 in the sense that
the fraction of early projects in the two regions di®er. More speci¯cally, ex
ante the regions are populated by many identical banks, each of them being
a monopolist in their local market and facing an identical pool of (many)
entrepreneurs. With probability p1 no macroeconomic shock occurs which
13This requirement is either exogenously imposed by regulators or endogenously deter-
mined as a result of unmodelled uncertainty.
10means that all projects in both regions generate cash °ows in t = 1. With
probability 1¡p1 a negative macroeconomic shock occurs which delays some
projects. In one region only a fraction ® of the bank loans generates cash
°ows at date 1 while in the other region a fraction ® of projects ¯nanced
by banks produce early cash °ows with ® > ®. Ex ante nobody knows
which region will be hit by the more severe macroeconomic shock. Thus,
while banks are identical ex-ante, in t1 half of them turn out to be weak, i.e.
having a higher fraction of delayed projects, while the other half turns out
to be strong, which means having a high fraction of projects that generate
an early return.
Closing this section, let us describe the time structure of the model. At
date 0 the ex ante identical banks compete for the investors' endowments.
They issue a mix of deposits and capital to investors and promise them the
maximum pledgable amount since consumption goods are short relative to
projects at that date. Investors will invest as long as their opportunity rate
of return, i.e. storage, is met. After raising cash, banks lend to entrepreneurs
in their local lending market. We normalize without loss of generality the
amount each bank can raise at date 0 to be 1. In lending to entrepreneurs
the banks will charge the maximum repayment °C on demand.
Shortly before date 1 entrepreneurs learn if their projects are early or
late. In case the project is late, an entrepreneur informs his bank about
the delay. Thus, banks know before date 1 the fraction of their bank loans
that turns out to be early projects. As soon as a bank discovers that even
with restructuring late projects it cannot generate enough liquidity to payo®
depositors, the banker tries to renegotiate the deposit repayments. This will
trigger right away a run and all the late projects will be restructured to yield
c1 immediately.
If their bank survives, entrepreneurs with early projects will repay °C
at date 1. These entrepreneurs have (1 ¡ °)C at their disposal which they
can either invest or consume. Entrepreneurs with late projects will default.
Then the bank decides how to deal with late projects. It can restructure the
projects if liquidity is needed at date 1 or it can reschedule the loan payment
until date 2 and keep the project as a going concern. Of course, what
decision gives the bank a greater value depends on the prevailing interest
rate and its need for funds. The bank itself uses repayments from the early
entrepreneurs, from the restructured late projects, and the cash invested by
early entrepreneurs in the bank (as deposits and capital) to repay investors
at date 1.
At date 2, the bank gets repayments from the unrestructured late projects.
Entrepreneurs will consume.
113 Stability of an individual bank
In this section we want to analyze the stability of an individual bank. It is
important to understand how decisions in the bank will be taken because of
their in°uence on the stability and the payo®s of three stakeholder groups
of the bank: bankers, capital owners, and depositors. The optimal decision
concerning restructuring or continuing late projects depends on the partic-
ular interest rate r that occurs in date t = 1.14 Although the banker would
always prefer to continue late projects, since only when continuing he earns
a rent but gets nothing in case of restructuring, the capital owners will force
the banker to maximize the net present value of the projects. The capital
owners of the bank want to consume at date 1 and therefore they try to
maximize the t1-consumption goods available to the bank. This means they
will force the manager to restructure a project if c1 >
°C
(1+k)r and let him
continue it otherwise, i.e. if c1 ·
°C
(1+k)r. The higher the interest rate for
getting liquidity, the more valuable is restructuring because it generates liq-
uidity immediately. But this restructuring decision is biased, because only
part of late projects' return is pledgable to outside ¯nanciers of the bank.
As long as c1 <
°C
r , it is socially ine±cient to restructure late projects.
Turning to the decision of depositors, we already mentioned that it is
individually rational for them to withdraw their funds whenever the net
present value of the bank at date 1 is not enough to ful¯ll their claims.
Consequently, a run on the particular bank is triggered whenever the sum
of deposits exceeds the net present value of the bank at date 1: D ¸ V1.15
Therefore, given that capital owners force bankers to restructure late
projects because r >
°C
(1+k)c1, depositors will run if




14In the following analysis we have taken the banks' date 0 portfolio decision concerning
investment in storage and lending as given and analyze the case where the bank will not
store but invest any funds in lending activity. We are sure this is the optimal decision
when the probability p1 for the state where all the projects in both regions are early, is
su±ciently high.
15Clearly, as in Diamond/Dybvig there exist two equilibria in those cases where D <
V1 but D > c1. Under these circumstances the individually rational decision of every
depositor depend on his belief about the decision of all other depositors. As long as he
expects the others to withdraw he also has an incentive to do so. But if he thinks the
others will wait until t = 1 he is also inclined to withdraw not before t = 1. Here we
assume that depositors will always wait until t = 1 as long as D · V1.
12Solving for (1¡®) gives the critical level of late projects that triggers a run:

















Thus, given that capital owner want to continue late projects a run will






It is easy to see that this interest rate level increases with ® and k. A
higher fraction of early projects just like a higher capital ratio increases the
stability of a bank. In the following analysis we assume that the fraction
of early projects in the strong region is so high enough so that the liquid-
ity in°ow from early projects is su±cient to repay deposits. Thus, strong
banks (those with the higher fraction of early projects) never depend on the
liquidity raised at the t1-¯nancial market to prevent a run. Therefore a run
on these banks can never be triggered by interest rate increases. However,
weak banks we assume to be dependent on the liquidity in°ow from ¯nancial
market transactions to repay depositors. Following equation (3) this means





4 Equilibrium in the liquidity market
The gross liquidity produced in the economy is the return on early projects.
But part of the liquidity goes to banks, which split it into rents to the
bank manager, return to capital owners and repayment to depositors. Since
we assume that bank managers, capital owners as well as depositors have
a discount rate of t2- consumption that exceeds any upper bound of the
equilibrium interest rate, they will immediately consume this fraction of the
liquidity. The other part of the liquidity produced by early projects are the
rents of the entrepreneurs. Since they do not discount future consumption,
they will supply their liquidity at the t1-¯nancial market, as long as they get
13at least a return of 1. Given the overall fraction (® + ®) of early projects in
both regions, the aggregate liquidity supply amounts to:
LS = (® + ®)(1 ¡ °)C (6)
Because all the stake holders in the bank - bank manager, capital owner
and depositors - have a strong preference for immediate consumption in t1,
the bank manager will try to raise liquidity against the pledgable income
of late projects, in order to repay deposits, pay the return on capital and
consume his own rents.
Proposition 1 In the secondary ¯nancial market banks try to borrow liq-
uidity from early entrepreneurs against the pledgable return of late projects.
In competing for the ¯xed liquidity supply of early entrepreneurs banks
bid up the interest rate. An increase in the interest rate reduces the present
value of the future pledgable income and the liquidity that each bank can
raise.
For an interest rate that only sightly exceeds 1 this simply reduces the
rents of the bank managers and the return of bank capital owners. As





banks in both regions are stable and will raise new funds against the
pledgable return of their late projects from early entrepreneurs in the given
mixture of capital and deposits. The demand for liquidity is given by the
pledgable return of both type of banks' late projects discounted with the
respective interest rate: (2 ¡ ® ¡ ®)
°¢C
(1+k)¢r.
But for interest rates above ^ r the liquidity available to weaker banks
falls short of the liquidity needed to repay all depositors. Banks with the
higher fraction of late projects will be subject to a run of its depositors.
The depositors will seize the banks' late projects and restructure them.
Therefore, beyond an interest rate of ^ r weak banks will not demand any
liquidity at the ¯nancial market. In contrast, the stronger banks can still
raise enough liquidity to repay their depositors. Since the fraction of late
projects is smaller at these bank, the fraction of liquidity provided by in°ows
from selling assets in the t1 ¯nancial market is smaller and the liquidity
available to these bank is less dependant on the interest rate. Therefore,
at interest rates above the threshold level ^ r only the strong banks demand
liquidity against the future pledgable return of their late projects.
However, at an interest rate exceeding ~ r =
°¢C
(1+k)¢c1 even strong banks
get into trouble. But not due to a run of their depositors. The liquidity
14available to these banks is even at this threshold level enough to repay the
deposits.16 At an interest rate above ~ r the returns to capital owners are
higher if projects are restructured in order to generate early returns. Thus,
bankers will be forced by capital owners not to continue late projects but to
restructure them. But if there is no late project continued in the economy
at an interest rate above ^ r there is not demand for liquidity at all.
If the interest rate meets exactly the threshold level ~ r capital owners
are indi®erent between restructuring and continuing late projects, so the
demand for liquidity - the fraction of continued late projects is undetermined
in that case.
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r = ~ r
(1 ¡ ®)
°¢C
(1+k)¢r ^ r < r < ~ r
(2 ¡ ® ¡ ®)
°¢C
(1+k)¢r r · ^ r
(7)
Obviously, given this aggregate liquidity demand three qualitatively very
di®erent equilibria occur depending on the aggregate liquidity supply, which
is given by the overall fraction of early projects in the economy.
Proposition 2 Depending on the aggregate fraction of late projects three
types of ¯nancial crises may emerge. 1) Slight liquidity crises, in which
no bank collapses, 2) moderate liquidity crises, in which only weak banks
are subject to a run and 3) severe liquidity squeezes, which also destabilize
stronger banks.
Given that the overall fraction of late projects is rather limited, a slight
liquidity crises occurs. This case is depicted in ¯gure 1. Trying to attract
new funds from the early entrepreneurs against the required mixture of
deposits and capital banks bid up the interest rate only slightly to
r¤ =









But this only reduces the rents of the bank manager and the return of
capital owners. It does not destabilize any bank in the economy.
16Note that we assumed ~ r always being below the interest rate level at which the strong
bank cannot raise enough liquidity to repay deposits: ^ r < ~ r < ^ ^ r.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in a slight liquidity crisis
Obviously, the interest rate in slight liquidity crises is the higher the
larger the aggregate fraction of late projects relative the fraction early
projects and the higher the relation of pledgable to non-pledgable income of
¯nished projects, since both describes the relative scarcity of liquidity in t1.
Moreover, the interest rate is higher if the capital requirements are smaller,
since capital requirements increase the rents of the banker and thereby re-
duce the returns of late project, that can be promised to new depositors and
capital owners.
However, if the cash in the market constraint is more restrictive, i.e.
the aggregate fraction of early projects smaller, the economy ends up in
a moderate liquidity crises, in which part of the banking sector collapses.
In that case, which is shown in ¯gure 2, the lack of liquidity causes the











At this level the liquidity in°ow at weak banks is insu±cient to meet the
repayment to depositors. Therefore, the bank with the stronger liquidity
needs will fail, whereas the stronger banks, which are less dependant on
the liquidity in°ow from transaction in the t1-¯nancial market will not be
destabilized by the liquidity squeeze and will continue all late projects. As
16-
.. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(® + ®) ¢ (1 ¡ °) ¢ C
LD = (1 ¡ ®)
°¢C
(1+k)¢r










. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
^ ^ r = 1
1¡k 1+®
1¡®
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .




Figure 2: Equilibrium in a moderate liquidity crisis
the weak banks fail their depositors seize the late projects and restructure
them. Since weak banks do not demand liquidity in the ¯nancial market at
this interest rate levels, the equilibrium interest rate in a moderate liquidity
crises only depends on the relation 1) of late projects at strong banks to the
overall fraction on early projects, 2) of pledgable to non-pledgable income
of ¯nished projects and 3) of returns bank can credibly promised to new
depositors and capital owners to the total return of the bank.
So roughly spoken, in a moderate liquidity crises only part of the banking
sector that is subject to a more or less idiosyncratic adverse liquidity shock
will collapse. The other part of the banking sector that does not face a
severe idiosyncratic liquidity shock, because only a limited fraction of its
projects turns out to be late, can ¯nish all projects.
In contrast, if the aggregate fraction of late projets is even higher the
economy ends up in a severe liquidity crisis. In this case equilibrium interest
rate will reach its upper bound
r¤¤¤ = ~ r (10)
Obviously, at this interest rate level weak banks collapse. But what dif-
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Figure 3: Equilibrium in a severe liquidity crisis
ferentiates a moderate from a severe liquidity crisis is that in the latter even
strong banks have to restructure part of their late projects. At the equilib-
rium interest rate ~ r capital owners are indi®erent between restructuring and
continuing late projects. However, the available liquidity is insu±cient to
repay all depositors. Therefore, the bank manager, who only receives a rent
if projects are ¯nished, will restructure just enough late projects to produce
su±cient liquidity to prevent a run. The fraction of late projects that can




















Apparently, the this fraction will be higher 1) the larger the aggregate
fraction of early projects relative to the fraction of late projects at strong
banks, 2) the higher the non-pledgable returns of entrepreneurs in relation
to the pledgable returns going to the banks and 3) the smaller the present
value of the fraction of the banks' returns that can credibly be promised
to new capital owners and depositors at the given interest rate ~ r. Inserting
the equilibrium value for ~ r into the last expression shows that this is just
18the relation between the pledgable return of late projects if continued to the
return of these projects if restructured (see equation (11)). Consequently, if
continuing late projects gives a higher return to banks relative to restruc-
turing, a higher fraction of late projects will be ¯nished even in a severe
liquidity shortage.
To sum up, in a severe liquidity shortage it is not enough that weak banks
fail and therefore stop demanding liquidity. If the aggregate fraction of late
projects is too high, even those banks that have ¯nanced a comparatively
small fraction of projects that turn out to be late will not be able to raise
su±ciently liquidity at the ¯nancial market. However, the stronger liquidity
rationed banks do not collapse, but they will have to restructure late projects
to raise su±cient liquidity to repay deposits.
Having described the equilibrium in the ¯nancial market it is straightfor-
ward to see which impact the particular type of the ¯nancial system has on
the equilibrium. Obviously, the higher fraction of pledgable income (°) in
bank-dominated ¯nancial systems shifts the entire liquidity demand to the
upper right. Because the higher the pledgable income the higher the present
value of late projects and the more aggressive banks can bid for fund in t1
in slight and moderate liquidity crises. In severe liquidity crises the higher
return on late projects makes capital owners more willing to accept a con-
tinuation of late projects even for higher interest rates. On the supply side a
higher fraction of pledgable income reduces the return of early entrepreneurs
reducing the liquidity supply in the economy. All these e®ects of a higher
fraction of pledgable returns point in same direction: Fluctuations of the in-
terest rate in case of a ¯nancial crisis are higher in bank-dominated ¯nancial
systems than in market-oriented ¯nancial systems. This is also re°ected in
the respective equations of the equilibrium interest rate (see equations (8),
(9) and (10))
A lower return on restructured projects (c1), which we also characterized
as being typical for a bank-dominated ¯nancial system only in°uences the
equilibrium interest rate in severe liquidity crises. The lower the returns form
restructuring late projects the higher the interest rate up to which capital
owners will accept a continuation of late projects of the bank manager.
Thus, as can also be seen in equation (10), the interest rate °uctuations in
severe liquidity crises also increase with a lower c1 and are therefore higher
in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems.
It is interesting to note, that also the threshold level for the di®erent
¯nancial crises with respect to a given liquidity supply depends on the type
of the ¯nancial system. Inserting ~ r into the liquidity demand one can derive
the threshold level for aggregate liquidity supply between moderate and
19severe liquidity crises. This shows that if the aggregate liquidity supply
falls short of (1 ¡ ®) ¢ c1 the economy ends up in a severe crisis. While
this threshold level obviously is not in°uenced by the fraction of pledgable
returns, it increases the higher the returns on restructured projects. Thus,
in market-oriented ¯nancial systems, in which c1 is higher, even for a higher
aggregate liquidity the economy ends up in a severe liquidity crisis, while in
bank-dominated ¯nancial systems given a certain level of aggregate liquidity
supply moderate liquidity crises are more likely. Similarly, the threshold
level between slight and moderate liquidity crises can be derived by inserting
^ r into the liquidity demand function showing that for a given liquidity supply
in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems characterized by a high ° it is more
likely to be in a moderate than in a slight liquidity crisis.
Proposition 3 In bank-dominated ¯nancial systems interest rate °uctua-
tions are higher in ¯nancial crises than in market-oriented ¯nancial sys-
tems. With a given liquidity supply moderate liquidity crises are more likely
in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems, while in market-oriented ¯nancial sys-
tems severe but also slight liquidity crises are more likely to occur.
5 Optimal LOLR-policy
Restructuring late projects is always welfare reducing in this economy. If the
interest rate is below ~ r this is most obvious, since in that case even net the
present value of the pledgable income from late projects that can credibly
be promise to capital owners and depositors of the bank is higher than the
returns generated if the projects are restructured.
c1 <
°¢C
(1+k)¢r for r <
°¢C
(1+k)¢c1
However, even in a severe liquidity crises were the equilibrium interest
rate reaches ~ r and the present value of the pledgable returns of continued
late projects that can be credibly promised to outside ¯nanciers of the bank
is therefore equal to the return of restructured late projects it would still be
strictly welfare improving to ¯nish all projects. If late projects are continued
entrepreneurs as well as bankers will earn a rent, while they both get nothing
if projects are restructured. Since both rents are not pledgable they are never
taken into account by capital owners of banks, when they decide to force
the bankers to restructure late projects.
But besides the fact that parts of the returns a ¯nished investment
project generates can not be passed on by entrepreneurs and bank man-
ager, which distorts the decision of bank owners to continue late projects,
20what contributes to the ine±cient termination of late project is the bank's
re¯nancing through deposits. What is in general the advantage of demand
deposits - the threat of a coordination failure among depositors that allows
bankers to credibly commit to repay - turns out to be a serious drawback in
a liquidity crises particularly for weak banks. Banks are not able to bargain
on the repayment of deposits in a crises situation to ¯nish late projects.
A LOLR can provide banks with additional liquidity. To keep the analy-
sis as simple as possible, we assume that the LOLR can raise the liquidity by
taxing t1-consumption. This can be interpreted as a shortcut for an in°ation
tax: The central bank as the LOLR increases the currency in circulation by
providing additional means of payments to the banks to enable them to set-
tle their nominal obligations. Since this increases the money supply without
changing the contemporaneous provision of goods, this simply reduces the
real value of money in terms of t1-consumption goods. It therefore resembles
a taxation of any t1-consumption in the economy.17
However, the provision of liquidity by the LOLR is associated with a
cost. An in°ation tax just like any other tax (apart from per capita taxes)
brings about ine±ciencies in the economy that cause welfare losses. For
simplicity we take these welfare losses as an exogenous cost, that increases
proportional with the volume of the liquidity assistance (LA): WL = ¯¢LA.
There are two distinct policies the LOLR can follow in providing the
liquidity to the banking sector in a crisis. The ¯rst option, which captures
the basic features of Bagehot's suggestions, is to supply liquidity to the
market by buying ¯nancial assets, i.e. bank equity or deposits. In doing
so the LOLR can stabilize the interest rate and prevent the banks from
restructuring late projects. The second option, which re°ects a more discrete
policy, is to provide liquidity assistance to individual banks. Applying this
policy the LOLR can supply liquidity at di®erent terms to di®erent banks.
In a slight liquidity crisis there is no need for a LOLR-intervention. All
late projects are continued in spite of the liquidity shortage. The interest
rate increase due to the slight liquidity squeeze only increases the consump-
tion of early entrepreneurs at the expense of bank managers and bank cap-
ital owners. Therefore, a slight liquidity crisis only causes a reallocation of
resources, that does not bring about any ine±ciencies.
Proposition 4 In a slight liquidity crisis there is no need for a lender of
last resort, since all late projects are continued anyway.
In a moderate liquidity crisis weak banks are threatened by a run in
17For a more detailed discussion of this argument see Allen and Gale (1998).
21which depositors would seize the assets and restructure the late projects.
Therefore, a liquidity assistance to prevent this could be bene¯cial.
If the LOLR decided to supply the weak banks with the funds to repay
the deposits through an individual assistance (IA), the amount of liquidity
the LOLR has to provide is given by deposits less the liquidity available to
the bank from the returns on early projects:
LAIA
m = D ¡ ® ¢ ° ¢ C (12)
The LOLR o®ers the liquidity assistance at the interest rate ^ r against
the future income of late projects that can be promised to outside ¯nanciers
of the bank. So in t1 there is just enough liquidity available to the bank to
repay depositors. Therefore, the LOLR-assistance enables depositors to col-
lect the full value of their deposits (D) from late projects not just the return
generated by restructuring (c1). Using the LOLR assistance even bank man-
agers and bank capital owners gain since they can at least realize their rents
from late projects (
2¢k¢°¢C
1+k ). However, since these rents are realized in t2 they
have to be discounted with the rather high discount factor ½ of bank man-
agers and capital owners.18 In addition, the LOLR-assistance enabling the
continuation of late projects also preserves the rents of late entrepreneurs.
In sum, an individual liquidity assistance in a moderate liquidity crisis can
generate welfare gains that amount to:
WGIA
m = (1 ¡ ®)
·







¡ ¯ [D ¡ ®°C] (13)
If the LOLR uses market interventions to prevent ine±cient restructur-
ing of late projects in a moderate liquidity crisis he has to provide additional
liquidity to the market up to the point where the interest rate is reduced
to ^ r. At this level weak banks get just enough liquidity against the future
pledgable returns of late projects to repay deposits. However, the additional
liquidity the LOLR has to provide in that case is larger than if he uses an
individual liquidity assistance. In addition to the liquidity needed at weak
banks to repay depositors, the LOLR also has to meet the increase in liquid-
ity demand of strong banks due to the interest rate reduction. Therefore,
the overall liquidity supply by the LOLR using market intervention (MI)
amounts to:
18Remember that we assumed a discount rate for these agents that always exceeds the
equilibrium interest rate. Therefore: ½ > ~ r.
22LAMI
m = LAIA
m + (1 ¡ ®) ¢
·
° ¢ C
(1 + k) ¢ ^ r
¡
° ¢ C
(1 + k) ¢ r¤¤
¸
(14)
However, there are no welfare gains associated with the increased liq-
uidity provision. The additional funds available to strong banks in t1 only
increase the consumption of bank managers and capital owners at the ex-
pense of the the consumption of early entrepreneurs. This reallocation is
neutral in terms of the overall welfare.
Therefore, the larger volume of liquidity provided in a market interven-
tion does not bring about any bene¯ts but causes additional costs. Thus
a market intervention is always inferior in a moderate liquidity crises. The
ine±ciency of a market intervention is the higher the bigger the costs of the
waste of liquidity. Inserting ^ r and r¤¤ into (14) the welfare losses from using















Obviously, the ine±ciency of a market intervention are more severe:
1. the larger the fraction of late projects at strong banks because
a) on the one hand this increases the additional liquidity demand of
strong banks and
b) on the other hand this reduces the supplied liquidity by early en-
trepreneurs in the economy increasing the liquidity that has to be
supplied additionally to strong banks,
2. the larger the fraction of late projects at weak banks, because an in-
crease in the fraction of late projects at weak banks
a) on the one hand this reduces the liquidity supplied by early en-
trepreneurs, too, and
b) on the other hand this reduces the threshold level to which the
LOLR has to bring down the interest rate to prevent a run on these
banks,
3. the smaller the capital requirements, which is also mainly due to the
reduction of liquidity demand by increasing capital requirements and
4. the lower the fraction of non-pledgable income (the higher the pledgable
return on late projects), also because this a higher pledgable return
increases additional liquidity demand of strong banks.
23Consequently, in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems, which are particu-
larly characterized by comparatively high levels of pledgable income, the
ine±ciencies of market interventions are more severe, whereas they are rel-
atively limited in market-oriented systems.
Proposition 5 If a LOLR-intervention is bene¯cial at all in a moderate
liquidity shortages an individual liquidity assistance is always preferable over
a market-intervention. However, the e±ciency loss of a market intervention
is higher in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems.
In a severe liquidity crisis not only late projects at weak banks but also
some of the delayed projects at strong banks would be restructured without
an additional liquidity supply by a LOLR.
Applying individual liquidity assistance in a severe liquidity squeeze the
LOLR would have to supply to weak banks the same amount of liquidity as
in moderate crises. In order to prevent the ine±cient restructuring of late
projects at weak banks the LOLR has to provide the additional liquidity
that weak banks need to repay depositors at he threshold level ^ r. But in
addition to prevent the ine±cient restructuring at strong banks the LOLR
has to supply them with the funds needed to ¯nish their late projects, too.
However, at strong banks it is not a potential run that could bring about the
restructuring of late projects. At these banks it is the capital owners that do
not allow the manager to pay higher interest rates than ~ r on funds allowing
to continue late projects. Bank managers can use only the liquidity they
get at ~ r, to ¯nish late projects, while they have to restructure the remaining
delayed projects. Therefore, the LOLR simply has to supply the additional
liquidity strong banks need to continue all late projects at ~ r. Thus, given
the fraction of restructured late projects at strong banks without a LOLR-
intervention (1¡¹¤¤¤) the overall liquidity the LOLR has to provide to the
banking system amounts to:
LAIA
s = D ¡ ®°C + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¹¤¤¤)
°C
(1 + k) ~ r
(16)
Besides the welfare gains due to preventing the restructuring at weak
banks in a severe crisis the LOLR-policy increases welfare by enabling strong
banks to continue their late projects, too. However, since at strong banks
depositors are repayed anyway, only bank managers, capital owners and
late entrepreneurs bene¯t from the LOLR intervention, since their rents are
preserved. Thus inserting the quilibrium values of ¹¤¤¤ and ~ r in a severe
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In contrast, if the LOLR pursues a market intervention he has to provide
enough liquidity to bring down the interest rate to ^ r, just like in a moderate
liquidity squeeze. But again in order to do so, it is not su±cient to supply
the same amount of liquidity to the market. At ^ r strong banks do not just
demand the liquidity needed to ¯nish all late projects. Since the present
value of their late projects is higher at ^ r than at ~ r the additional liquidity
they demand is given by:
LAMI
s ¡ LAIA
s = (1 ¡ ®)
·
°C






But this additional liquidity provision again only brings about a reallo-
cation of consumption between the bank managers and capital owners on
the one hand and early entrepreneurs on the other. Thus, there are no
overall welfare gains associated with this additional liquidity supply, only
extra costs to raise these additional fund. Consequently, compared to an
individual liquidity assistance market interventions are also ine±cient in se-
vere liquidity crises. Inserting ^ r and ~ r into (19) the welfare gains from using
an individual liquidity assistance instead of a market intervention as the
LOLR-policy in a severe liquidity crises are given by:
WGIA
s ¡ WGMI









Obviously, applying individual liquidity assistance as the LOLR-policy
is the more preferable in severe liquidity crises:
1. the smaller the fraction of late projects at strong banks, because this
reduces the ine±cient additional liquidity demand of strong banks,
2. the smaller the fraction of late projects at weak banks, because an
increase in the fraction of late projects at weak banks reduces the
threshold level to which the LOLR has to bring down the interest rate
to prevent a run on these banks,
3. the smaller the capital requirements, which is also mainly due to the
reduction of liquidity demand by increasing capital requirements,
254. the higher the pledgable return on late projects, also because this
increases additional liquidity demand of strong banks and and
5. the lower the return on restructured projects, since the lower c1 the
higher the di®erence between the interest rate in a market interven-
tion ^ r and the highest sustainable interest rate for strong banks ~ r
and therefore the higher the additional (wasted) liquidity provision to
strong banks in a market intervention.
Proposition 6 In a severe liquidity crisis an individual liquidity assistance
is always preferable over a market-intervention, too. The e±ciency loss of
a market intervention is also higher in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems in
the case of a severe liquidity squeeze.
To sum up, in all kinds of liquidity crises in which a LOLR-intervention
is bene¯cial an individual liquidity assistance is strictly preferable. However,
the welfare gains of an individual liquidity assistance compared to a market
intervention vary with the particular parameter setting of the respective
economy. Most interestingly, an individual liquidity assistance is in general
more preferable the more the parametrization of the economy resembles a
bank-dominated ¯nancial system. For instance, in both moderate as well as
severe liquidity crises a high relation of pledgable to non pledgable income
in ¯nancial relations between ¯rms and banks (a higher °), which is due
to the relationship lending most characteristic for bank-dominated ¯nancial
systems, makes an individual liquidity assistance more preferable. Moreover,
relatively low returns from restructured projects (c1), which is also typical
for bank-dominated ¯nancial system compared to market oriented ¯nancial
systems, make an individual assistance more bene¯cial, too.
So far we did not take into account the di®erent informational require-
ments of the LOLR-policies. However, it is obvious that an individual liquid-
ity assistance requires much more information to be e®ective than a market
intervention.
To pursue an individual liquidity assistance the LOLR has to collect
precise information about the liquidity needs of every single bank. Besides
the administrative costs, this takes time and may cause an ine±cient delay
of the LOLR-intervention. This is particularly true, since banks do not
have an incentive to honestly report their liquidity needs to the LOLR. By
overstating the fraction of late projects bank managers could increase the
individual liquidity assistance and at the same time reduce the interest rate
the LOLR demands on the provided liquidity. Both increases his rents.
26In contrast, if the LOLR applies market interventions, the LOLR only
has to keep the interest rate in the money market at the threshold level ^ r.
Given that the lower bound (1¡®) of the distribution of the fraction of late
project is public information, there is no information on individual banks
required by the LOLR.
In order to take these considerations into account but keep the analysis
tractable we assume that there are some ¯xed informational costs associated
with a policy of individual liquidity assistance.
So obviously, given these additional costs a policy of individual liquidity
assistance is only preferable if the welfare gains of this LOLR-policy out-
weighs these costs. But as we have already argued the gains of an individual
liquidity assistance di®er with respect to the ¯nancial system under consid-
eration. Thus, in a bank-dominated ¯nancial system in which the e±ciency
gains of an individual liquidity assistance are relatively large in moderate
as well as in severe liquidity crises it is rather likely that a LOLR prefers
to bear the additional information costs in order to be able to pursue this
LOLR-policy. In contrast, in market-oriented ¯nancial systems, where the
drawback of market interventions is in both types of ¯nancial crises less
severe, the LOLR may decide to save the costs of acquiring the required in-
formation for an individual liquidity assistance and use market interventions
to provide the banking system with additional liquidity.
Proposition 7 Taking into account, that there are more cost intense in-
formation requirements associated with an individual liquidity assistance, a
LOLR-policy based on individual liquidity assistance may be preferable in
bank-based ¯nancial system but not in market-oriented ¯nancial systems.
6 Conclusions
In this paper on liquidity crises and lender of last resort policies we can
distinguish between three di®erent types of crisis situations. In a slight liq-
uidity crisis there is no need for a lender of last resort. No banks are subject
to a run, the only thing we observe is a slight increase of interest rates. In
contrast, a moderate liquidity crisis is characterized by runs on weak banks.
Depositors seize assets and late projects will be restructured. Finally, in a
severe liquidity crisis not only runs on weak banks can be observed but also
strong banks will be liquidity rationed and have to partially restructure their
late projects. Accordingly, in a moderate and in a severe liquidity crisis the
intervention of a lender of last resort may be preferable to prevent runs from
occurring.
27However, from our main results we can draw a connection between ¯nan-
cial system con¯gurations and the optimal lender of last resort policy, i.e. a
market intervention following Bagehots' rules and lending liquidity freely at
penalty rates, or a individual liquidity assistance provided discretionary by
the lender of last resort.
In a moderate as well as in a severe liquidity crisis individual liquid-
ity assistance guarantees a more e±cient allocation of the provided liquid-
ity. However, in both crisis situations the welfare losses due to the ine±-
cient waste of liquidity are higher in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems than
in market-oriented ¯nancial systems. Thus, taking into account the more
costly informational requirements of a lender of last resort that follows a
policy of an individual liquidity assistance it may follow that the informa-
tion costs outweigh the e±ciency gain from a individual liquidity assistance
in a market-oriented but not in a bank-oriented ¯nancial system.
Presumably, this argument in favor of a market intervention in market-
oriented ¯nancial systems can further be strengthened: By incorporating
into the analysis that a market intervention proportionally wastes more liq-
uidity in the moderate than in the severe liquidity crises, we get lower e±-
ciency loss from market intervention in a severe liquidity crisis if the infor-
mational costs of the LOLR increase with the amount of liquidity provided
on an individual basis. Having in mind that under reasonable assumption a
market-oriented system is more often in a severe than in a moderate liquid-
ity crisis, this implies that the e±ciency losses of a market intervention are
lower still in a market-oriented system.
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